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competes with many ‘non-genuine’ producers supplying the compatible third-party
or generic products. We examine whether non-genuine products should be expelled
from markets. In particular, we focus on the genuine producer’s strategies for driving
out non-genuine products: running comparative advertising, building technical bar-
riers, and improving the quality of genuine products. Although the small amount of
spending on advertising or building technical barriers improves social welfare, their
equilibrium amounts are socially excessive. The quality improvement may raise or
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1 Introduction
Should non-genuine products, which are sometimes called generic and third-party prod-
ucts, be expelled from markets by legal restriction only because they are not genuine?
When we focus on the protection of first mover’s advantage, this question seems to be
redundant. Taking into consideration the fact that non-genuine producers do not pay the
cost for inventing a new product and introducing it into the market, it may be natural to
consider that non-genuine products should be expelled from the market.
However, to answer this question rigorously, we should shed light on the difference
between genuine and non-genuine products from the viewpoints of consumers and the
behavior of producers of genuine/brand-name products (genuine producers). In this con-
text, the following questions arises: Why do consumers consider the quality of genuine
products to be higher than that of non-genuine products? There are two reasons that
underlie this belief. First, the quality of genuine products is truly higher than that of
non-genuine products. For example, consumers know that the lives of branded bags are
typically much longer than that of non-branded bags and that non-genuine items are
sometimes significantly inferior to genuine items. Second, consumers, who are exposed
to a significant amount of persuasive and comparative advertising, are misled by genuine
producers. For perishable items, such as machine parts and ink cartridges, genuine prod-
ucts may fit machines better than non-genuine products. Thus, consumers may be easily
misled by genuine producers who exaggerate the advantage of using their products.
Genuine producers typically have market power; the most important source of market
power is consumers’ love of genuineness. Some consumers prefer genuine products to non-
genuine products even if the former are significantly more expensive than the latter and
the difference in quality between the two types of products is small, although others do
not care about the quality difference and buy non-genuine products.1 Genuine producers
are able to set higher prices because of the existence of consumers who are enthusiastic
about genuineness.
This market power provides genuine producers with opportunities to increase their prof-
its. First, as noted above, genuine producers mislead consumers by running comparative
advertising against non-genuine products, which increases demand for their products.2
1Regarding brand-name products, a survey found that two-thirds of consumers are happy to sport
fake products (”ANALYSIS: Keeping it real,” IN-STORE, Aug 2007, 9-11).
2In this paper, comparative and persuasive are synonymous.
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Second, they establish technical barriers against non-genuine products: It becomes costly
for non-genuine producers to produce compatible products. For example, a printer maker
may make ink cartridges produced by third parties incompatible with its printers. A com-
mon theme in these two strategies is that genuine producers try to drive out non-genuine
products from the market. Third, quality improvement makes it possible for producers
to set higher prices and, accordingly, make higher profits. Thus, genuine producers are
likely to invest in improving the quality of their products.
The purpose of this paper is to examine a genuine producer’s behavior of driving out
non-genuine products. In particular, our research questions are as follows: (i) how the
strategic behavior of a genuine producer, such as running comparative advertising, estab-
lishing technical barriers, and improving the quality of the product, affects the market
equilibrium; (ii) whether or not the government should regulate such behavior of the gen-
uine producer; and (iii) whether or not the government should regulate the entry of firms
that supply non-genuine products (non-genuine producers).
Governments generally have several options for regulating genuine or non-genuine pro-
ducers. For example, intellectual property law can be used to drive out non-genuine
producers by granting a genuine producer an exclusive right to the market for a certain
period. Patent law is effective, in particular, in the case of industrial goods, whereas a de-
sign right is effective in driving out imitators in the case of dresses and bags. Governments
can also establish entry barriers by creating regulations, such as technical standards. On
the other hand, antitrust law can be used to promote the entry of non-genuine producers
by reducing the monopoly power of a genuine producer. Removal of technical standards
is also effective in introducing competition into markets.
We adopt a model in which both genuine and non-genuine products are supplied.
The former is supplied by one firm, whereas the latter is supplied competitively. The
genuine producer has two strategies for increasing demand for its products in the basic
model: advertising and technical barriers. The former strategy increases the perceived
utility of consumers and the latter strategy increases the marginal cost of non-genuine
producers. Accordingly, both strategies generate a demand shift from non-genuine to
genuine products. We also consider the case in which the genuine producer can invest in
quality improvement.
Persuasive advertising has been analyzed in the field of industrial organization for sev-
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eral decades.3 Recently, Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) examined the welfare effect of misin-
formation when firms engage in Cournot competition. Hattori and Higashida (2012, 2014,
2015) also examined the effect of misleading advertising on welfare when firms’ products
are differentiated.4 Unlike Glaeser and Ujhelyi (2010) and Hattori and Higashida (2012,
2015), we consider technical barriers and quality investment in addition to advertising.
In terms of the imitating activities of follower firms, innovation has been examined
in the literature. For example, see Klempler (1990), Gallini (1992), Pepall and Richards
(1994), Lyon and Huang (1996), Wright (1999), Ceccagnoli (2005), and Bessen and Maskin
(2009), among others. Unlike the literature on innovation and imitation, we focus on the
welfare effect of legal restrictions relating to genuine producers’ advertising and technical
barriers.5
The main results of our study are as follows. Both advertising and technical bar-
riers are excessive in market equilibrium in terms of social welfare, although a small
amount/level of advertising/technical barriers improves welfare. The reason why a small
advertising/technical barriers is welfare improving is that genuine products are supplied
insufficiently without advertising and technical barriers. Advertising and technical bar-
riers mitigate this insufficiency by shifting consumption from non-genuine products to
genuine products. However, advertising and technical barriers are costly, and the cost
of non-genuine products also increases in the case of technical barriers. In addition, the
demand increase for genuine products leads to a price increase in the genuine product.
Because the genuine producer does not take into consideration the loss of consumers and
the cost increase in the production of non-genuine products, advertising and technical
barriers are excessive in market equilibrium.
We find that both advertising and technical barriers complement each other in terms of
the profit of the genuine producer. Therefore, the greater number of strategies a genuine
producer has, the more excessively non-genuine products are driven out. Because this
excessiveness is serious, welfare is necessarily greater under complete prohibition of both
advertising and technical barriers than at the market equilibrium. We also find that
prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers may improve welfare. Entry of non-genuine
3See Bagwell (2007) for a survey on the economics of advertising.
4Persuasive advertising has also been analyzed in the field of consumer research. For example, Ra-
jagopal and Montgomery (2011) examined the effect of false memories on consumers’ behavior and showed
that exposure to imagery-evoking advertising can result in erroneous beliefs.
5Mizuno and Odagiri (1990) considered a situation in which firms spend on both advertising and R&D.
However, they did not consider regulations and welfare.
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producers promotes competition, but it induces increases in advertising and technical
barriers. Prohibition expunges the benefits gained from competition but saves on the costs
of advertising and technical barriers. When the genuine producer chooses to implement
a large amount of advertising and a high level of technical barriers, the saved costs are
large under prohibition of non-genuine products.
Moreover, the analysis of investment in quality improvement by a genuine producer
gives rise to interesting results. The amount of investment is insufficient given certain
amounts of advertising and technical barriers in terms of social welfare. However, a
quality improvement of genuine products leads to increases in advertising and technical
barriers. Then, the distortion caused by these two strategies used by the genuine producer
increases, which may spoil the positive welfare effect of quality improvement.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides real-world examples, Section
3 constructs the basic model, Section 4 examines legal restrictions on advertising and
technical barriers used by a genuine producer, Section 5 examines the prohibition of entry
of non-genuine producers, Section 6 introduces quality investment by a genuine producer,
and Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2 Examples
We can observe notable examples of the effects of comparative advertising and technical
barriers in the market for printer ink. Battles for office machine after-products have been
ongoing over the past few decades. In 1995, Hewlett-Packard, Canon, and Seiko Epson
sued Nu-Kote, which supplied non-genuine ink cartridges, for infringing on patents held
by the first three giant suppliers, which supply genuine cartridges.6
Consumers typically consider the quality of genuine cartridges to be higher than that
of non-genuine ones. In a certain sense, this belief is true. Jeff (2008) tested both brand-
name and third-party inks to compare image quality and fade resistance and proved that
genuine inks produce better-quality prints and are more resistant to fading. However, Jeff
(2008) also concluded the following:7
Deciding between brand-name and third-party alternatives depends in part on how you
plan to use your prints. — If your prints tend to be for one-time-only office presentations,
6See The New York Times article titled ”Patents” on October 30, 1995.
7The article in The New York Times titled ”New printer cartridge or a refill? either way, ink is getting
cheaper” drew similar conclusions about this choice problem for consumers (Feb 4, 2006).
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text documents for school, or temporary color images (such as plain-paper photos), inks
from third-party supplies may be a reasonable cost-saving option.
Observing real situations, we notice that many consumers prefer genuine products to
non-genuine products. For some people, the higher quality of genuine inks is important
because they need to keep photos for a long period of time. However, other people
appear to be misled by the suppliers of genuine ink cartridges. These suppliers sometimes
emphasize the facts that genuine ink is more accurate and has a longer lifespan and that
non-genuine ink causes battered prints, toner leakage, and even printer malfunctions. This
type of comparative advertising gives rise to consumers’ bias towards genuine inks.
The suppliers of genuine inks often establish technical barriers to entry of non-genuine
ink. For example, these suppliers sometimes warn that they do not give warranties for
printers if consumers use third-party inks. Canon began to sell printers that reject third-
party inks by setting a filter against infrared light in its printers because third-party ink
cartridges radiate infrared light, whereas Canon’s genuine ink cartridges radiate visible
rays.8
Moreover, patent law sometimes plays a key role in the market for ink cartridges.
Printer makers have numerous patents on ink/toner cartridges, which lead to higher
quality prints. However, these companies may use patent systems to drive out non-genuine
products. There have been several lawsuits over the past two decades regarding this issue.
For example, Epson filed a patent infringement lawsuit against a third-party ink cartridge
producer in China in 2001. Epson also sued other third parties and won the lawsuits in
2005.9 Canon and Epson also claimed that recycled ink cartridges infringed upon the
patents held by these printer makers and requested an injunction in Japan. However,
Canon and Epson lost these lawsuits in 2004 and 2006, respectively. The presiding judge
determined that the patents under consideration lacked novelty.10 In 2011, Canon won
another lawsuit against six third parties regarding the infringement of Canon’s patent on
LED cartridges. Although lawsuits have drawn much attention to date, it is clear that
regulation policies influence the competition among genuine and non-genuine producers.
8Third parties filed a lawsuit on the violation of the competition law.
9See the following articles: “Epson files patent infringement lawsuit against prominent replacement
cartridge manufacturer (Business Wire, 17 Apr, 2001),” “Seiko Epson wins ink cartridge patent suit in
U.S. (Jiji Press English News Service, 11 Mar, 2005).
10See the following articles: “Court ruling on cartridge deals blow to Canon (FT.com, 8 Dec, 2004)”
and “Seiko Epson loses suit on ink cartridge patent (Jiji Press English News Service, 18 Oct, 2006).”
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Our analysis can be applied to other types of markets, including brand-name bags,
brand-name clothes and auto parts, to name a few. For example, consider the case of
street vendors who sell imitation goods close to the department stores and genuine shops.
In some cases, they are driven out from the street by law because selling those goods
is regarded as piracy. However, in other cases, vendors keep selling a great variety of
imitation goods.11 Authorities can establish the rules of vending, such as regulations on
the vending place. Moreover, genuine shops can hire security guards to prevent street
vendors from selling imitation goods in front of their shops. In both cases, the cost
of selling imitation goods for street vendors increases. The former case is considered
a government intervention, and the latter case is considered one of technical barriers
established by genuine shops.
3 The Model
There exists a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who differ in their degree of love
of genuineness in products, θ, which is assumed to be uniformly distributed among con-
sumers, θ ∈ [0, θ¯], with unit density. Two types of products are supplied to the market:
a genuine product (good 1) and a non-genuine product (good 2). The two products are
compatible in the sense that both are equipped with basic properties. Each consumer pur-
chases either product.12 The ‘perceived’ (or ‘ex-ante’) surplus of consumers θ is defined
as follows:
us =
{
us,1 = v1 + s− p1 + θ,
us,2 = v2 − p2,
where vi, pi, and s denote the true quality, the price of the good i (i = 1, 2), and the
degree of misperception, respectively. The variable θ is also considered to represent addi-
tional qualities, which, depending on the consumer, produce different amounts of surplus.
Misperception, s, is created by a genuine producer through comparative advertising. A
positive amount of s implies that consumers misperceive the quality of genuine product
to be higher than it truly is. We assume that consumers are na¨ıve, i.e., they only observe
v1 + s regarding the quality of good 1. Thus, they determine which type of product to
buy based on the perceived surplus.
11See Rozhon and Thorner (2005).
12As noted below, the market is fully covered in the present setting of the model. See Assumption 1.
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On the other hand, ‘true’ (or ‘ex-post’) consumer surplus is defined as follows:
ut =
{
ut,1 = v1 − p1 + θ,
ut,2 = v2 − p2.
Because misperception affects consumers’ preferences before a purchase but does not affect
the utility of consuming it, it is not included in the true surplus.
A marginal consumer, who is indifferent between purchasing goods 1 and 2, is repre-
sented as:
θˆ = (p1 − p2)− (v1 + s) + v2. (1)
Therefore, the demand for each type of product is as follows:
x1 = θ¯ − θˆ, x2 = θˆ. (2)
The genuine product is supplied by only one firm, firm 1 (a genuine producer), whereas
non-genuine products are supplied competitively. Firm 1 can run comparative advertising
to create misperception: Advertising makes the artificial contrast between genuine and
non-genuine products sharper from the consumers’ point of view.
Firm 1 can also set technical barriers against the entry of non-genuine producers. The
technical barriers increase the marginal cost of supplying non-genuine products, c˜2; in
particular, the marginal cost is given by c˜2 = c2 + b, where c2 and b denote the ordinary
marginal cost and the level of technical barriers, respectively. The competitive supply of
non-genuine products ensures that p2 = c˜2. We assume that v2 − c˜2 > 0, implying that it
is impossible for firm 1 to completely drive out non-genuine products from the market by
implementing only technical barriers.
Let Cs(s) and Cb(b) respectively denote the cost of running advertising and the cost
of setting technical barriers with C ′j > 0 and C
′′
j > 0 (j = s, b). For simplicity, we specify
the cost functions as: Cs(s) = µss
2/2 and Cb(b) = µbb
2/2, where µj > 0 (j = s, b) is the
cost parameter. We assume both costs are independent of each other.
The profit of firm 1 is given by
pi1 = (p1 − c1) · x1 − Cs(s)− Cb(b) = (p1 − c1) · x1 − 1
2
µss
2 − 1
2
µbb
2,
where c1 denotes the marginal cost of producing a genuine product. Firm 1 chooses the
price, the amount of advertising, and the level of technical barriers such that its profit is
maximized.
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The government knows the true quality of good 1. Thus, the consumer surplus is
evaluated based not on perceived surplus, us, but on true surplus, ut.
13 Welfare is defined
as:
W = (v2 − c˜2)θˆ +
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(v1 − p1 + θ)dθ + pi1. (3)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the sum of the true surplus of consumers
who purchase the non-genuine product, whereas the second term represents the sum of
the true surplus of consumers who purchase the genuine product.
3.1 Equilibrium Misperception and Technical Barriers
As a benchmark, we characterize the market equilibrium where the genuine producer
sets p1, s, and b in the absence of any regulations by the government. The first-order
conditions (FOCs) for firm 1 are given by
∂pi1
∂p1
= x1 − (p1 − c1) = 0, (4)
∂pi1
∂s
= (p1 − c1)− µss = 0, (5)
∂pi1
∂b
= (p1 − c1)− µbb = 0. (6)
Note that ∂2pi1/∂k
2 < 0 (k = p1, s, b). Moreover, the second-order conditions (SOCs) are
assumed to be satisfied.14
In the following, we use gi ≡ vi−ci, (i = 1, 2) and G ≡ g1−g2 to respectively represent
the true-quality-cost gap of each type of product and the difference in the gaps. Then,
using (4), (5), and (6), the market equilibrium is characterized as:
p∗1 =
µsµb(θ¯ +G)
2µsµb − µs − µb + c1, (7)
x∗2 = θˆ
∗ =
(µsµb − µs − µb)θ¯ − µsµbG
2µsµb − µs − µb , x
∗
1 = θ¯ − θˆ∗ =
µsµb(θ¯ +G)
2µsµb − µs − µb , (8)
s∗ =
µb(θ¯ +G)
2µsµb − µs − µb , b
∗ =
µs(θ¯ +G)
2µsµb − µs − µb , (9)
Note that 2µsµb−µs−µb > 0 from the assumption that the SOCs hold. The equilibrium
values depend on the true-quality-cost gap of the two types of products, G, and the cost
parameters, µs and µb. Moreover, we formulate the following assumption.
13We follow pre-advertising welfare that is defined by Dixit and Norman (1978).
14The second inequality in Assumption 1 ensures that the SOCs hold.
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Assumption 1 The following four inequalities hold:
θ¯ +G > 0, µsµb − µs − µb > 0, θ¯ > µsµbG
µsµb − µs − µb , g2 >
µs(θ¯ + g1)
µb(2µs − 1) .
The first inequality ensures a positive quantity of genuine products, whereas the second
and third conditions ensure a positive quantity of non-genuine products. The fourth
inequality ensures that v2−p2 = v2− c˜2 > 0, implying that the consumers obtain positive
utilities from buying non-genuine products.
4 Should Genuine Producers Be Regulated?
4.1 Excessive or Insufficient?
To verify whether the behavior of the genuine producer should be regulated, we first
investigate whether the equilibrium level of advertising and technical barriers are excessive
or insufficient in terms of welfare. To this end, we divide the analysis of firm 1’s choice
into two stages: In the first stage, firm 1 chooses the level of advertising and technical
barriers, and in the second stage, it determines the price of the genuine product.15
Let superscript E denote the equilibrium variable in the second stage. Therefore, firm
1’s profit in the first stage (Π1), before choosing s and b, is given by
Π1 =
(
pE1 (s, b)− c1
) · xE1 (s, b)− 12µss2 − 12µbb2.
Note that pE1 and x
E
1 satisfy (1), (2), and (4).
From (4), (5), and (6), it is obtained that
∂Π1
∂j
=
θ¯ + (v1 + s− c1)− (v2 − c2 − b)
2
− µjj = 0, j = s, b. (10)
Based on Assumption 1 and the fact that ∂2Π1/∂s∂b = 1/2, the SOCs are satisfied for
this profit maximization problem in the first stage.16
Let us focus on the first stage. From (4),
θˆE =
θ¯ − (v1 + s− c1) + (v2 − c2 − b)
2
.
Therefore, partial differentiation of welfare with respect to advertising yields
∂W
∂s
= −v2 − c˜2
2
−
∫ θ¯
θˆE
1
2
dθ +
v1 − p1 + θˆE
2
+
∂Π1
∂s
. (11)
15Because all of the endogenous variables are determined by firm 1, the sequential and simultaneous
choice of variables leads to the same result at the market equilibrium.
16If the second inequality of Assumption 1 holds, µs > 1 and µb > 1 hold.
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The first term in the right-hand side represents the loss from a decrease in the consumption
of good 2; the second term represents the loss from the price increase of good 1; and the
third term represents the benefit from an increase in the consumption of good 1. Because
v2− c˜2 = v1+s−p1+ θˆE holds in equilibrium, the evaluation of (11) at ∂Π1/∂s = 0 yields
∂W
∂s
∣∣∣∣
∂Π1/∂s=0
= −s
2
−
∫ θ¯
θˆE
1
2
dθ = −s
2
− x1
2
< 0, (12)
which implies that the equilibrium advertising is socially excessive.
We also obtain
∂W
∂b
= −θˆE − v2 − c˜2
2
−
∫ θ¯
θˆE
1
2
dθ +
v1 − p1 + θˆE
2
+
∂Π1
∂b
. (13)
In addition to the effect of advertising, the loss from an increase in the marginal cost of
supplying good 2 arises (the first term on the right-hand side). Similar to the case of
advertising, the evaluation of (13) at ∂Π1/∂b = 0 yields
∂W
∂b
∣∣∣∣
∂Π1/∂b=0
= −θˆE − s
2
−
∫ θ¯
θˆE
1
2
dθ = −θˆE − s
2
− x
E
1
2
< 0, (14)
which implies that the equilibrium technical barriers is also socially excessive. Note that
∂2W
∂s2
= −3
4
+
∂2Π1
∂s2
< 0,
∂2W
∂b2
=
1
4
+
∂2Π1
∂b2
< 0,
∂2W
∂s∂b
= −1
4
+
∂2Π1
∂s∂b
> 0.
These inequalities imply that the SOCs for welfare maximization are satisfied.
Equations (11) and (13) do not imply that advertising and technical barriers always
harmful to welfare. The evaluation of (11) at s = b = 0 yields
∂W
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=b=0
=
x1
2
+
∂Π1
∂s
∣∣∣∣
s=b=0
> 0.
Similarly, the evaluation of (13) at s = b = 0 yields
∂W
∂b
∣∣∣∣
s=b=0
= −θˆ + x1
2
= −x2 + x1
2
+
∂Π1
∂b
∣∣∣∣
s=b=0
,
which implies that a small amount of technical barriers improves welfare if x1 ≥ 2x2.
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
(i) Both equilibrium level of advertising of a genuine product and technical barriers to
the entry of non-genuine products are excessive from a welfare point of view.
(ii) A small amount of advertising necessarily improves welfare.
(iii) A small technical barrier to the entry of non-genuine products improves welfare if the
market share of genuine products is large ( x1 ≥ 2x2).
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Proposition 1 implies that the optimal (in the sense of second-best) levels of advertising
and technical barriers are between zero and those at market equilibrium. The intuition
is as follows. Advertising does not change any of the true qualities or marginal costs
(vi, c1, c˜2). Because firm 1 has market power, the price-cost margin (p1 − c1) is positive.
Thus, if s = 0, uˆt,1 = uˆs,1 = uˆs,2 = uˆt,2 and uˆt,1 + p1 − c1 > uˆt,2 hold, where uˆs,i and
uˆt,i represents the perceived and true surpluses of a marginal consumer when purchasing
good i (i = 1, 2). For the following analysis, we refer to ut,1 + p1 − c1 as the gross
surplus of good 1, which is different from perceived or true consumer surpluses (us,1 or
ut,1). A small increase in advertising induces a purchase shift from non-genuine to genuine
products. Thus, when evaluated at s = 0, a small increase in advertising increases the
gross surplus of good 1 and, accordingly, welfare. This situation is illustrated in Figure
1, in which ci (i = 1, 2) and b are assumed to be zero. Superscript O denotes the case
without advertising, and p′1 and θˆ
′ represent the price and the consumer, who is indifferent
between the two types of products when a small amount of advertising is sent by firm
1, respectively. The lightly shaded area represents welfare when there is no advertising.
A small amount of advertising decreases the consumer surplus because the price of the
genuine product increases and its true quality does not change. However, a certain number
of consumers shift their purchasing products from non-genuine to genuine products, which
increases the gross surplus of good 1, which is defined as ut,1+ p1− c1.17 The net increase
in gross surplus is indicated by the dark shaded area.
A small increase in technical barriers has the same effect on the purchasing behavior
of a marginal consumer because it shifts purchases from non-genuine products to gen-
uine products. In this sense, welfare increases. However, technical barriers increase the
marginal cost of supplying non-genuine products. Thus, uˆs,2(= uˆt,2) decreases. In this
respect, welfare decreases. When the market share of genuine products is large, the former
effect dominates the latter, leading to welfare improvement. The situation is illustrated in
Figure 2, in which ci (i = 1, 2) and s are assumed to be zero. The dark shaded area repre-
sents an increase in welfare due to a small amount of technical barriers, arising from the
shift of purchasing products from non-genuine to genuine products. The lightly shaded
area represents a decrease in consumer surplus due to an increase in the marginal cost of
supplying non-genuine products.
When the effect of an increase in advertising is evaluated at s > 0, welfare does not
17Note that the cost of running advertising is not shown in this figure.
12
necessarily increase. In this case, uˆt,1 < uˆs,1 = uˆs,2 = uˆt,2 holds. Thus, a purchase
shift by a marginal consumer from a non-genuine product to a genuine product decreases
his/her own true surplus. In addition, similar to the case of no advertising, a true surplus
of consumers of good 1 necessarily decreases because of the higher price set by firm 1,
although the profit of firm 1 may increase even if the cost for running advertising increases.
Thus, an increase in the profit of firm 1 may not dominate a decrease in the consumer
surplus. In such a case, advertising at market equilibrium is excessive in terms of welfare.
The excess amount of technical barriers can be analyzed in a similar manner.
The loss to consumers should be noted again. An increase in advertising increases the
price of a genuine product. Thus, a consumer who continues to purchase a genuine product
clearly loses. A consumer who changes her/his purchased product from a non-genuine to
genuine product also loses because he/she changes his/her consumption behavior because
of advertising; advertising does not improve true quality. A consumer who continues to
purchase a non-genuine product neither gains nor loses from an increase in advertising.
However, in the case of higher technical barriers, a consumer who continues to purchase
a non-genuine product also loses due to the higher price of non-genuine products. Thus,
even if welfare improves due to an increase in advertising or technical barriers, consumers
lose from the change. In this sense, advertising and technical barriers have a type of
redistribution effect from consumers to the genuine producer.
4.2 Regulating the Genuine Producer
It may sometimes be difficult for the government to fine-tune the level of advertising and
technical barriers by regulations. In such a case, complete prohibition of the genuine
producer’s strategies to drive out non-genuine products may be an alternative. This
policy restricts the rights of firm 1 to increase its market share by lowering compatibility
or running comparative advertising, whereas it allows non-genuine producers to enter the
market more freely.
First, we compare the market equilibrium with the situation in which both advertising
and technical barriers are prohibited: we refer to the latter situation as complete prohi-
bition and let superscript CP denote this situation. In the absence of both advertising
and technical barriers, the consumer who is indifferent between both types of products is
represented as
θˆCP = p1 − c2 − v1 + v2.
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In this case, firm 1 can choose only the price of its product. Thus, the FOC is ∂pi1/∂p1 = 0.
In turn, we obtain the equilibrium price and consumption quantities:
pCP1 =
θ¯ +G
2
+ c1, x
CP
1 =
θ¯ +G
2
, xCP2 = θ¯ − xCP1 =
θ¯ −G
2
. (15)
From Assumption 1 and equations (7) and (8), it is clear that the price and the quantity of
the genuine product consumed are greater at the market equilibrium than under complete
prohibition. Accordingly, the profit of firm 1 is greater in the former situation than in the
latter.
On the other hand, complete prohibition necessarily increases consumer surplus. First,
because technical barriers vanish, consumers who keep purchasing non-genuine products
benefit from a price decrease of the non-genuine product. Second, the prohibition of
advertising lowers the price of the genuine product, which benefits consumers who keep
purchasing genuine products. Third, because the consumer surplus gained by purchasing
either type of product increases, consumers who change the type of product they purchase
also benefit from complete prohibition.
In terms of welfare, the effect of complete prohibition can be divided into four parts.
First, the benefit from the disappearance of technical barriers is given by
x∗2 · b∗ =
(µsµb − µs − µb)θ¯ − µsµbG
2µsµb − µs − µb ·
µb(θ¯ +G)
2µsµb − µs − µb , (16)
which is necessarily positive. Second, the costs of running advertising and setting technical
barriers are saved; the amount is
µs(s
∗)2
2
+
µb(b
∗)2
2
=
µsµb(µs + µb)(θ¯ +G)
2
2(2µsµb − µs − µb)2 (17)
which is clearly positive. Third, from (3), the effect of purchase shift is given by
−(x∗1 − xNB∗1 ) ·G−
(ˆθCP )2
2
+
(ˆθ∗)2
2
= − (µs + µb)(θ¯ +G)G
2(2µsµb − µs − µb) −
(θ¯ −G)2
8
+
{
(µsµb − µs − µb)θ¯ − µsµbG
}2
2(2µsµb − µs − µb)2 , (18)
which is negative under Assumption 1 as long as G > 0 because the loss of firm 1 is greater
than consumers’ gain. In other words, the gross surplus generated by the consumption
of a genuine product is greater than that generated from the consumption of a non-
genuine product, and a purchase shift from genuine to non-genuine products decreases
gross surplus. Fourth, an increase in the surplus of consumers who keep purchasing the
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genuine product represents a redistribution from firm 1 to those consumers. Thus, in
terms of welfare, an increase in the consumer surplus and a decrease in the profit of firm 1
cancel out. As a whole, the positive effects dominate the negative effect. Thus, complete
prohibition necessarily improves welfare.18
Next, we consider a case in which only either one of two strategies, comparative adver-
tising or technical barriers, is prohibited. In reality, the authority that regulates advertis-
ing is often different from the authority that regulates technical barriers.19 Therefore, it
is meaningful to examine partial prohibition, which is the prohibition of either advertising
or technical barriers.
We let J denote the case of partial prohibition. The equilibrium price, consumption
quantities, and the amount of advertising/technical barriers are as follows:
pJ1 =
µj(θ¯ +G)
2µj − 1 + c1, x
J
1 =
µj(θ¯ +G)
2µj − 1 ,
xJ2 = θ¯ − xJ1 , jJ1 =
θ¯ +G
2µj − 1 , j = s, b.
Compared with the case in which only one strategy, advertising or technical barriers, is
prohibited, the cost of running advertising or establishing technical barriers is saved in
the case of complete prohibition:
µj(θ¯ +G)
2
2(2µj − 1)2 . (19)
On the other hand, the quantity of genuine products consumed under prohibition of only
one strategy is greater than that under complete prohibition. Therefore, gross surplus in
the latter case minus that in the former case may be negative:
− (θ¯ +G)G
2(2µj − 1) −
(θ¯ −G)2
8
+
{
(µj − 1)θ¯ − µjG
}2
2(2µj − 1)2 . (20)
However, summing both effects, ((19) and (20)), reveals that the difference is necessarily
positive: 3(θ¯+G)2/ {8(2µj − 1)}2 > 0. Moreover, in the case of prohibition of advertising,
there is an additional cost for non-genuine producers (b). This cost is swept out under
complete prohibition.
Overall, we obtain the following result.
18See Appendix for the details.
19For example, in the case of Japan, the Consumer Affairs Agency regulates some types of advertising
such as false advertising, whereas technical barriers are regulated by the Fair Trade Commission.
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Proposition 2
(i) Welfare under complete prohibition of both comparative advertising and technical
barriers is necessarily greater than that at market equilibrium.
(ii) Welfare under prohibition of either one of the two strategies is necessarily greater than
that at market equilibrium.
(iii) Welfare under complete prohibition of both comparative advertising and technical
barriers is necessarily greater than that under prohibition of either one of the two strate-
gies.
(iv) Because both strategies complement each other, prohibition of either strategy sup-
presses the incentive of the genuine producer to increase the other strategy.
The third result of Proposition 2 reveals that even if only one strategy for firm 1 is allowed,
the amount of advertising or the level of technical barriers is clearly excessive in terms
of social welfare. This result also implies that even if advertising or the implementation
of technical barriers gives rise to benefits from purchasing shifts, the loss incurred from
paying the cost for running advertising or setting technical barriers dominates the benefits.
We should clarify who benefits from which type of prohibitive regulations. Proposition
2 suggests that, for society, complete prohibition is the most-preferred intervention, and
the prohibition of either one strategy is better than no regulations.20 The difference
between prohibition of advertising and technical barriers is an increase in the marginal
cost of good 2. Thus, prohibition of technical barriers is better than that of advertising.
On the other hand, the more strategies the genuine producer has, the more profit it can
gain. Thus, no regulation is the best situation, and prohibition of advertising and that of
technical barriers are no different from the perspective of the genuine producer.21
5 Should Non-Genuine Producers Be Regulated?
5.1 Regulating Non-genuine Producers
Because the genuine producer has market power and sets the price of genuine products
higher than the marginal cost, the supply of genuine products is insufficient in terms
20Recall that a small amount of advertising or technical barriers improves welfare. Thus, if it is possible
for the government to fine-tune the level of advertising or technical barriers, complete prohibition is not
the best choice.
21The present setting of the model assumes full coverage of the market. However, if partial coverage of
the market is considered, welfare under complete prohibition of these strategies may be worse than that
at market equilibrium. This situation occurs because these strategies may increase the total number of
consumers who buy either genuine or non-genuine products.
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of welfare. In this respect, the promotion of entry of non-genuine products seems to
improve welfare. However, when non-genuine producers are allowed for entering into
the market, the genuine producer may run advertising and establish technical barriers.
If the costs for these strategies are large, the legal restriction of entry of non-genuine
products may improve welfare by saving the costs. Although we have assumed that firm
1 cannot drive out non-genuine products from the market completely (see Assumption 1),
the government may be able to shut out those non-genuine products completely by law,
which restricts the rights of non-genuine producers. For example, supplying imitation
products is usually strictly restricted to protect the benefit of genuine producers that
have created new technologies and designs in many countries.
The strict restriction, such as complete prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers, is
not necessarily the first-best choice. In fact, non-genuine/fake goods have been surviving
such restrictive measures, which implies that there is enormous demand for cheaper non-
genuine products.22 However, it may sometimes be difficult for the government to fine-
tune genuine and non-genuine producers’ behavior. Thus, it is interesting to compare the
case of prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers with the market equilibrium. Note
that, under the prohibition, the genuine producer does not need to set technical barriers.
Moreover, because we assume that advertising is comparative, the genuine producer does
not run advertising either.
First, we examine whether the market is fully covered when entry of non-genuine
producers is completely prohibited. In this case, firm 1 behaves as a monopolist. When
it aims at full coverage, it has to set the price equal to v1. If the price is higher than this
value, consumers with low degree of love of genuineness purchase nothing. Total supply
is θ¯ and the profit is g1θ¯.
On the other hand, suppose that firm 1 chooses partial coverage. The surplus of
consumer θ is u = v1 − p1 + θ. Therefore, the demand for a genuine product is given by
xM1 = θ¯+ v1 − p1, and the profit of firm 1 is represented as piM1 = (p1 − c1) · (θ¯+ v1 − p1),
where superscript M denotes the case of no entry of non-genuine producers. Solving the
profit maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium price and output:
pM1 =
θ¯ + g1
2
+ c1, x
M
1 =
θ¯ + g1
2
. (21)
22In the case of fake designer goods, such as bags and wallets, see the following articles: O’connell and
Hudson (2006); Anonymous, May 11, 2011, “South Korean capital’s government clamps down on fake
goods,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific; Arceo-Dumlao (2011).
17
Therefore, the profit at equilibrium is
piM1 =
(θ¯ + g1)
2
4
.
Comparison of the profit under full coverage and that under partial coverage reveals that
the former is smaller than the latter:
g1θ¯ − (θ¯ + g1)
2
4
= −(θ¯ − g1)
2
4
< 0.
Thus, firm 1 necessarily chooses partial coverage.
From (7) through (9), we obtain the equilibrium profit with entry of non-genuine
products:
pi∗1 =
µsµb(θ¯ +G)
2
2(2µsµb − µs − µb) .
Note that (µsµb)/(2µsµb − µs − µb) is greater than 1/2. Thus, when µs, µb, and g2 are
relatively small, the profit with entry of non-genuine products is likely to be greater than
that in the absence of non-genuine products. Interestingly, in such a case, the comparison
between (8) and (21) reveals that the amount of genuine products consumed with entry
of non-genuine products is likely to be greater than that in the absence of non-genuine
products. Moreover, (7) and (21) reveals that the price of good 1 is also higher when non-
genuine producers enter the market than when entry is prohibited. This fact implies that
consumers who purchase genuine products lose from the entry of non-genuine producers,
whereas consumers who purchase non-genuine products benefit from the entry of non-
genuine producers. In this respect, it can be concluded that prohibition of non-genuine
producers may have a type of redistribution effect from genuine producers and consumers
who purchase non-genuine products to consumers who purchase genuine products.
On the other hand, if µs, µb, and g2 are relatively large, firm 1 cannot drive out non-
genuine products effectively, and accordingly, the profit of firm 1 with entry of non-genuine
products is smaller than that in the absence of non-genuine products. Moreover, the
consumption quantity of genuine products can be smaller with the entry of non-genuine
producers than that under entry prohibition.
In terms of welfare, the costs of running advertising and setting technical barriers are
saved by prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers, which is given by (17). The
smaller the cost parameters and the larger the value of G, the larger the value of (17).
Thus, in terms of cost saving of advertising and technical barriers, cost parameters and
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the difference in the true-quality-cost gaps between genuine and non-genuine products
play a key role in determining whether prohibition is welfare-improving.
The welfare effect of prohibition also depends on the degree of purchase shift from non-
genuine to genuine products. Equation (21) reveals that the consumption quantity under
prohibition of non-genuine products does not depend on the cost parameters of advertising
and technical barriers: the larger the g1, the larger the consumption quantity. On the other
hand, the consumption quantity of non-genuine products under entry prohibition depends
on the cost parameters and the true-quality-cost gaps of both products. In particular, the
larger the cost parameters and the smaller the difference in the true-quality-cost gaps,
the greater the consumption quantity of non-genuine products. It is obvious that when
the consumption quantity of non-genuine products is large, and when the consumption
quantity of genuine products under entry prohibition is large, the positive purchase-shift
effect of entry prohibition is strong.
Table 1 highlights four typical cases. In Cases 1 and 2, the profit of firm 1 (consumer
surplus) is smaller (greater) when non-genuine products are supplied than when they
are prohibited to enter the market. However, welfare in the former situation is smaller
(greater) than in the latter situation in Case 1 (Case 2). Case 3 is interesting: Both the
amount of genuine products consumed and welfare are greater when genuine products are
supplied than in the absence of those products. In Case 4, the profit of firm 1 is greater
in the former situation than in the latter.
When non-genuine products are supplied, firm 1 has an incentive to increase the de-
mand for genuine products by driving out non-genuine products from the market. When
the cost parameters are small, the demand-expansion effect of genuine products is large.
Thus, the amount of genuine products consumed can be greater when non-genuine prod-
ucts are supplied than when no non-genuine producers enter the market.23
23The importance of technical barriers should be noted. Even if there are no non-genuine products,
firm 1 may be able to expand demand for genuine products by running persuasive advertising, although
it is not comparative. Rather, firm 1 runs advertising that excessively emphasizes the positive features
of its product. Even in such a case, firm 1 cannot expand its demand by setting a technical barrier,
which implies that firm 1 has more means to increase demand for its product in the presence of entry of
non-genuine products than in the absence of such entry. Consequently, it may hold that the amount of
genuine products consumed is greater with the entry of non-genuine products than without such entry.
19
5.2 Which Producers Should Be Regulated?
Finally, we compare the case of regulating the genuine producer, i.e., complete prohibition
of advertising and technical barriers, with the case of regulating non-genuine producers,
i.e., entry prohibition. In other words, we investigate whose rights should be restricted.
As described in the previous subsection, we focus on the case in which the market is
partially covered under prohibition of non-genuine producers. Equations (15) and (21)
reveal that the consumption of genuine products is greater under prohibition of non-
genuine products than under regulation of the genuine producer. However, at least,
consumers with very low θ purchase nothing when no non-genuine product is supplied.
Thus, which type of regulation is superior depends on the sizes of g1 and g2, which can
be verified as follows.
Consider the shift from the case of regulation of the genuine producer to the case of
entry prohibition of non-genuine products. From (15), the welfare loss caused by losing
non-genuine products is given by
λ1 = −g2 · (θ¯ − g1 + g2)
2
, (22)
and the welfare gain by an increase in the purchase of genuine products is given by
λ2 =
∫ θ¯−g1+g2
2
θ¯−g1
2
(g1 + θ) dθ. (23)
Total effect is obtained by summing up (22) and (23):
λ1 + λ2 = −g2 · (2θ¯ − 10g1 + 3g2)
8
. (24)
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3
As compared with welfare in the case of regulating the genuine producer, welfare under
entry prohibition of non-genuine products is likely to be greater (i) when the true-quality-
cost gap of the genuine product is large, and/or (ii) the true-quality-cost gap of non-
genuine products is small. Moreover, the magnitude of the welfare effect depends on the
true-quality-cost gap of non-genuine products.
For example, if both of g1 and g2 are large, the consumption of genuine products under
prohibition of non-genuine producers can be much greater than that under regulation
of the genuine producer. Thus, the benefit gained from changes in purchasing products
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from non-genuine to genuine products generated by entry prohibition, which represents an
increase in gross surplus from the consumption of good 1, dominates the loss of consumers
who buy nothing under prohibition of non-genuine producers. In addition, the magnitude
of the welfare effect is large.
We have compared two extreme situations. However, even if the government is able
to fine-tune the amount of advertising and/or the level of technical barriers, determining
which type of producers should be regulated depends on the true-quality-cost gaps. We
presented examples concerning the printer ink industry. There has been a growing demand
for the protection of the rights of genuine producers, as indicated by the trend towards the
stricter protection of intellectual property rights. In the printer and ink industry, giant
genuine producers appear to have advantages over third-party ink-cartridge suppliers.
However, if we focus only on the aspect of intellectual property rights, we may choose a
situation in which there are too few non-genuine producers in the market.
6 Investment in Quality Improvement
Improvement in true quality is another strategy for differentiating a genuine product
from non-genuine products. In this section, we focus on the quality improvement of a
genuine product and clarify the effect of an increase in quality improvement on advertising,
technical barriers, and welfare.
For clarity, we redefine the qualities of both types of products: v1 = v + V1 and
v2 = v + V2. Vi (i = 1, 2) denotes quality improvement. Firm 1 invests in quality
improvement, i.e., the investment directly increases V1. However, the spillover effect
exists in the improvement of the quality of genuine products: V2 = αV1. The variable α
can be considered to represent the degree of patent protection: The stricter the protection
of patents is, the smaller α becomes. The profit of firm 1 can be rewritten as follows:
piV1 = (p1 − c1) · x1 − Cs(s)− Cb(b)− Cv(V1), C ′j > 0, C ′′j > 0 (j = s, b, v)
where the last term denotes the cost of quality investment. Superscript V denotes the case
involving quality investment. We consider the following sequential choices of variables by
firm 1.24 In the first stage, firm 1 chooses the amount of quality improvement; in the
second stage, it simultaneously chooses the level of advertising, technical barriers, and
24This sequential setting is a device for clarifying the results of this section. Because there is only one
player in this game, firm 1, the setting of simultaneous determination leads to the same choices.
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price of the genuine product. The equilibrium variables in the second stage can be written
similarly to those in Section 3.1 (Eqs (7), (8), and (9)).
First, let us examine the effect of a change in quality on the price and consumption
quantity of a genuine product, advertising, and technical barriers. From (8) and (9), we
obtain
∂pV1
∂V1
=
(1− α)µsµb
2µsµb − µs − µb ,
∂xV1
∂V1
=
(1− α)(µs + µb)
2(2µsµb − µs − µb) ,
∂sV
∂V1
=
(1− α)µb
2µsµb − µs − µb ,
∂bV
∂V1
=
(1− α)µs
2µsµb − µs − µb . (25)
From Assumption 1, it holds that 0 < ∂bV /∂V1 < ∂p
V
1 /∂V1 < 1. Consequently, we
obtain the following result: (i) Quality improvement of genuine products (an increase
in V1) necessarily increases advertising, technical barriers, and the consumption quantity
of genuine products at market equilibrium; (ii) the price increase of genuine products
is smaller than the quality increase of genuine products; (iii) the price increase of non-
genuine products is smaller than the quality increase of non-genuine products; and (iv)
(a) the stricter the protection of patents is and (b) the smaller the cost parameters are,
the greater the price increase becomes. The results (ii) and (iii) reveal that a consumer
who continues to purchase a genuine or a non-genuine product benefits from the quality
improvement. On the other hand, the effect of quality improvement on the surplus of
consumers who change their purchased products is ambiguous because of the existence of
a distortion caused by comparative advertising.
Then, we ask whether the quality investment improve welfare. From (12), (14) and
the envelope theorem, total differentiation of welfare with respect to quality improvement
yields the following:
dW
dV1
∣∣∣∣
∂pi1/∂j=0 (j=s,b,V1)
= −
(
sV ∗1
2
+
xV ∗1
2
)
· ds
V ∗
1
dV1
−
(
θˆV ∗ +
sV ∗1
2
+
xV ∗1
2
)
· db
V ∗
2
dV1
+αθˆV ∗ − (1− α)s
V ∗
1
2
+
(1 + α)xV ∗1
2
. (26)
From (8), (9), and (25), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4
Suppose that there are no regulations on advertising and technical barriers. When the
protection of patents is strict, an increase in quality investment at market equilibrium
decreases welfare. On the other hand, when the protection of patents is lax, an increase
in quality investment at market equilibrium improves welfare.
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See Appendix for the details. The intuition is as follows. When the protection of patent is
strict, the spillover effect is small and, accordingly, the price decrease of genuine products
caused by this spillover is small. Moreover, in such a situation, the quality improve-
ment of genuine products increases the market power of genuine producers, which leads
to large increases in advertising and technical barriers. Thus, it is likely that the loss
from increases in advertising and technical barriers dominates the gains obtained from
quality improvement. On the other hand, when the protection of patents is lax, the gains
dominate the loss.
Furthermore, (25) reveals that when the cost parameters are small, advertising and
technical barriers increase greatly in response to an increase in the quality of genuine
products. Thus, it is more likely that (26) is negative.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined a genuine producer’s behavior in driving out non-genuine
products. In particular, we considered how the strategic behavior of a genuine producer,
such as running comparative advertising, establishing technical barriers, and improving
product quality, affects the market equilibrium; whether the government should regulate
such behavior of the genuine producer or the entry of non-genuine producers.
We demonstrated that both advertising and technical barriers are excessive at mar-
ket equilibrium in terms of social welfare, although a small amount/level of advertis-
ing/technical barriers improves welfare. The key factors are an insufficient supply of
genuine products and the costs of running advertising and establishing technical barriers.
Advertising and technical barriers mitigate the insufficiency by shifting consumption from
non-genuine products to genuine products. However, advertising and technical barriers
are costly, and the cost of non-genuine products also increases in the case of technical
barriers. The latter negative effect dominates the former positive effect at market equilib-
rium, whereas the former effect dominates the latter effect when the amount of advertising
or technical barriers is small.
Because the excess of advertising and technical barriers at market equilibrium is serious,
welfare is greater under complete prohibition of both advertising and technical barriers
than at market equilibrium. We also found that prohibition of entry of non-genuine
producers may improve welfare because the consumption of genuine products increases
and the costs of advertising and technical barriers are saved.
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Moreover, we investigated the case in which a firm producing genuine products can
invest in quality improvement. An improvement in the quality of genuine products leads
to increases in advertising and technical barriers when there are no regulations. Therefore,
an improvement in the quality of genuine products may decrease welfare. In such a case,
the driving-out strategies of genuine producers should be regulated.
Our results reveal that in the presence of efforts by genuine producers to drive out
non-genuine products, legal restriction of those efforts may be justified. The government
should also consider the possibility that prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers is
a better way to improve welfare compared with regulating genuine producers’ driving-
out strategies. Moreover, when considering the promotion of quality investment and/or
stricter patent protection, the government should consider the responses of genuine pro-
ducers to the driving-out strategies.
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Appendix
The Details for Proposition 2
We examine the first result. Summing up (16) through (18), we obtain welfare under
prohibition of both advertising and technical barriers less welfare under the market equi-
librium:
WCP∗ −W ∗ = 1
8(2µsµb − µs − µb)2 ·
{
(12µ2sµb + 4µsµ
2
b − 5µ2s − 2µsµb + 3µ2b)θ¯2
−(2µ2s − 4µsµb − 6µ2b)θ¯G− (4µ2sµb − 3µ2s − 6µsµb − 3µ2b)G2
}
.
From Assumption 1, the difference above is positive irrespective of the sigh of G.
The Details for Proposition 4
From (8), (9), and (25), we obtain that
−
(
sV ∗1
2
+
∫ θ¯
θˆV ∗
1
2
dθ
)
· ds
V ∗
1
dV1
−
(
θˆV ∗ +
sV ∗1
2
+
∫ θ¯
θˆV ∗
1
2
dθ
)
· db
V ∗
2
dV1
= − (1− α)µs
2µsµb − µs − µb · θˆ
V ∗
−(1− α)µb(µs + µb)(µs + 1)
2(2µsµb − µs − µb)2 ·
{
θ¯ + (vV ∗1 − c1)− (vV ∗2 − c2)
}
On the other hand,
αθˆV ∗ − (1− α)s
V ∗
1
2
+
∫ θ¯
θˆV ∗
1 + α
2
dθ
= αθˆV ∗ +
µb((1 + α)µs − (1− α))
2(2µsµb − µs − µb) ·
{
θ¯ + (vV ∗1 − c1)− (vV ∗2 − c2)
}
.
Thus, the smaller (larger) is α, the more likely it is that (26) is negative (positive).
References
[1] Arceo-Dumlao, T. (2011). Louis Vuitton sees more harm than flattery in cheap imita-
tions, Tribune Business News, July 24, 2011.
25
[2] Bagwell, K. (2007). The economic analysis of advertising, in Armstrong, Mark and
Robert Porter eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization 3, North Holland, 1701-1844.
[3] Bessen, J., and E. Maskin (2009). Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation,
RAND Journal of Economics 40, 611-635.
[4] Ceccagnoli, M. (2005). Firm heterogeneity, imitation, and the incentives for cost re-
ducing R&D effort, Journal of Industrial Economics 53, 83-100.
[5] Dixit, A., and V. Norman (1978). Advertising and welfare, Bell Journal of Economics
9, 1-17.
[6] Gallini, N. T. (1992). Patent policy and costly imitation, RAND Journal of Economics
23, 52-63.
[7] Glaeser, E. L., and G. Ujhelyi (2010). Regulating misinformation, Journal of Public
Economics 94, 247-257.
[8] Hattori, K., and K. Higashida (2012). Misleading advertising in duopoly, Canadian
Journal of Economics 45, 1154-1187.
[9] Hattori, K., and K. Higashida (2014). Misleading advertising and minimum quality
standards, Information Economics and Policy 28, 1-14.
[10] Hattori, K., and K. Higashida (2015). Who benefits from misleading advertising?,
Economics, forthcoming.
[11] Jeff, B. (2008). Cheap ink: will it cost you?, PC World 26.8, 93-98.
[12] Klempler, P. (1990). How broad should the scope of patent protection be?, RAND
Journal of Economics, 21, 113-130.
[13] Lyon, T. P., and H. Huang (1996). Innovation and imitation in an asymmetrically-
regulated industry, International Journal of Industrial Organization 15, 29-50.
[14] Mizuno, M., and H. Odagiri (1990). Does advertising mislead consumers to buy low-
quality products?, International Journal of Industrial Organization 8, 545-558.
[15] O’connell, V., and K. Hudson (2006). Not our bag, Coach says in a lawsuit alleging
target sold counterfeit purse, Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2006.
[16] Pepall, L. M., and D. J. Richards (1994). Innovation, imitation, and social welfare,
Southern Economic Journal 60, 673-684.
[17] Rajagopal, P., and N. V. Montgomery (2011). I imagine, I experience, I like: the
false experience effect, Journal of Consumer Research 38, 578-594.
26
[18] Rozhon, T., and R. Thorner (2005). On the Streets, Genuine Copies (And a Few
Originals), New York Times, May 26, 2005.
[19] Wright, D. J. (1999). Optimal patent breadth and length with costly imitation, In-
ternational Journal of Industrial Organization 17, 419-436.
27
v1 v2 μs μb x1 CS π1 Welfare x1 CS π1 Welfare
Case 1 8 6 40 5 10 24.7 324.3 518.8 843.1 24 288 576 864
Case 2 8 6 40 8 20 23 392.6 483.3 875.9 24 288 576 864
Case 3 4.5 2.8 30 8 20 17.4 171.1 275.3 446.4 17.3 148.8 297.6 446.3
Case 4 8 4 40 4 10 26.7 231.1 586.7 817.8 24 288 576 864
With Non-Genuine
(Market Equilibrium) No Non-genuineParameters
Table 1. Comparison between Entry and No Entry of Non-genuine Products. ( c1=c2=0)
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Figure 1. The case where an increase in misinformation  
increases gross surplus. 
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Figure 2. The case where an increase in technical barriers 
increases gross surplus. 
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